Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

The Republic Group, INC. v. Won-Door
Corporation, Reed A. Watkins, Jay A. Smart, Ron
Smart, and Does 1 through 20 : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard K. Crandall; Robert G. Norton; Attorneys for Appellant-Plaintiff.
Jeffrey M. Jones; Durham, Evans & Jones; Richard A. Rappaport; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal;
Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The Republic Group v. Won-Door Corporation, No. 920330 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3254

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

tfl&CKr-tf$J

JN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

CASE No. 920330-CA

WON-DOOR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
REED A. WATKINS, JAY A. SMART,
RON SMART, and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants-Respondents

Argument Priority
15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from Judgment of Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels
Jeffery M. Jones Esq.
Durham, Evans & Jones
1200 Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Attorneys for RespondentDefendant Won-Door Corp.
Richard A. Rappaport Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for RespondentsDefendants Jay & Ron Smart

Richard K. Crandall Esq.
340 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 363-0600
and;
Robert G. Norton Esq.
8991 Rua Branca Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:(801) 9432-5527
Attorneys for Appellant Plaintiff

FILED
BAN 221993
Mar''

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
THE REPUBLIC GROUP, INC.
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

CASE No. 920330-CA

WON-DOOR CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
REED A. WATKINS, JAY A. SMART,
RON SMART, and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants-Respondents

Argument Priority
15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from Judgment of Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels
Jeffery M. Jones Esq.
Durham, Evans & Jones
1200 Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Attorneys for RespondentDefendant Won-Door Corp.
Richard A. Rappaport Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for RespondentsDefendants Jay & Ron Smart

Richard K. Crandall Esq.
340 East 100 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801) 363-0600
and;
Robert G. Norton Esq.
8991 Rua Branca Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:(801) 9432-5527
Attorneys for Appellant Plaintiff

Walter F. Faber Jr. Esq.
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801) 486-5634
Attorney for RespondentDefendant Reed A. Watkins

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

14

ARGUMENT:
I
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE WATKINS,
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The Plaintiff was in fact the procuring cause
of the sale of the shareholder's stock in Won-Door
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March 12 Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants.
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FRAUD IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE PLAINTIFF.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal was initially incorrectly filed with this Court on November 4, 1991 (910721CA). On January 27, 1992 this appeal was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court. On May
26, 1992 the Utah Supreme Court poured-over this appeal to this Court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Respondent, did the trial court err
in finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact the existence of which would entitle
Appellant to judgment against the Respondents as a matter of law. Inasmuch as summary
judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary judgment presents
for review only questions of law and no particular deference is given to the trial court. (See
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Transamerica v. Dixie Power 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990))
More particularly, considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Appellant:
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that as a matter of law the August 22, 1986

handwritten agreement (App. p. 16) was the controlling and binding agreement between the
parties (R. p. 415)
2.

Under the circumstance of this case did Watkins have a duty of good faith and fair

dealing in his dealings with the Appellant and particular in negotiating the August 22, 1986 hand
written agreement:
3.

Did Watkins breach his duty of good faith and fair dealing in negotiating the

August 22, 1996 had written agreement by:
1

a.

Failing to disclose to Appellant that he was in serious negotiation for the

sale of all of the stock of Won-Door with one of Appellant's previously disclosed contacts (TSI);
b.

Misrepresenting that he was not negotiating with any of Appellant's

contacts other than Luecadia:
c.

Requiring Appellant to limit it's fee to ten contacts, ostensibly pursuant

to the requirements of an agreement entered into by Watkins with a third party (Boettcher
Agreement; App p. 2-7) subsequent to his agreement with Appellant and without approval of the
Appellant and ait time when Appellant had contacted more than ten companies for the purpose
of finding a buyer of all of the stock of Won-Door at Watkin's request;
d.

Dealing directly with principles of the Appellant despite request from

Appellant's attorney to deal with him.
4.

Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Respondant, did the trial

court err as matter of law in impliedly finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact the
existence of which would entitle the Appellant to paritial summary judgment against the
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case Appellant-Plaintiff Republic claims that the Defendants-Respondents owe it
a finders fee for finding a buyer (Thermal Systems Inc also known a TSI) that eventually
purchased all the stock of Defendant-Respondent Won-Door Corporation for $39,750,000 in cash
and securities. The Complaint in this matter was filed on June 14, 1988 (R. p.2 ). Defendants

2

ERRATUM
(pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure)
INSERT THE FOLLOWING ON PAGE 2, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING STATEMENT OF THE CASE

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Inasmuch as summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge
to summary judgment presents for review only questions of law and no particular deference is
given to the trial court. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Transamerica v. Dixie
Power. 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990).

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 11, 1990 (R. p. 97 ). Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about October 16, 1990 (R. p. 492 ). On October
30, 1999 Won-Door filed a Motion to Strike asking the court to strike various portions of the
Affidavits of Irvin D. Bird, Mark McSwain and Bryant Cragan which where submitted by
Republic in support of it's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. p. 198). Oral argument on these motions was
presented to Judge Scott Daniels on August 12, 1991. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge
Daniels without stating his reasoning beyond the fact the he felt Plaintiff claims were "thin"
Judge Daniels granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order granting
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on November 4, 1991 and another copy
of the same Order was entered again on November 5, 1991 (R. pp 329-33). This is an appeal
from the District Court's Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants and
effectively denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As evidenced from the Record before the District Court the following are the undisputed
facts:
1.

Reed A. Watkins, Esq. ("Watkins"), by virtue of a letter published on February

20, 1986 by Won-Door Corporation1 entitled "To Whom It May Concern" (the "Agency
Letter") was the express agent of defendants Won-Door and its shareholders for the purpose of

1

R. p. 279 (letter from Jay A. Smart, President of Won-Door authorizing and directing
attorney Reed A. Watkins to locate a source of funding for the company).
3

locating "ftinding for Won-Door by means of initial public offering or private placement of
stock."
Under the terms of the Agency Letter, Watkins had the authority to contract, if he saw fit, for
the sale of all of the outstanding stock of Won-Door Corporation ("Won-Door").
2.

In early 1986, Watkins contacted Irvin Bird, a long standing personal friend,

business associate and former client of Watkins' law firm, and asked Bird to help him raise
funds for Won-Door or its shareholders. Watkins thereafter engaged The Republic Group
("Republic") as a finder of ftinding for Won-Door and its shareholders.2
3.

Watkins delivered a letter dated March 12, 1986 ("March 12 Agreement"),3

confirming that Won-Door and its shareholders agreed to engage Republic as the finder of a
purchaser of 176,000 shares of outstanding stock of Won-Door at a total purchase price
$7,392,000.00 ($42.00 per share). "Upon the completion of such ftinding arrangement with
Republic's contact(s), the commission of $250,000.00 would be paid to Republic." The letter
also required that Republic, to avoid confusion, submit the names of "qualified contacts" to
Watkins.4
4.

Shortly after the March 12 Agreement, Republic informed Watkins that it had

become apparent that there was little or no interest in purchasing a minority position (22%) of
2

See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R pp. 101157; Affidavit of Irvin Bird. R. pp 474-486.
3

See R. p. 17.

4

Id.
4

a closely held family corporation and asked Watkins for authority to contact for the purpose in
obtaining offers for all, or a controlling interest, of Won-Door's outstanding stock.5
In later March and early April 1986 Reed Watkins authorized Republic to contact potential
purchasers for the purpose of obtaining offers from companies willing to purchase all of WonDoor's outstanding stock.6
5.

During March, April, May, June, July and August of 1986, with Watkin's

knowledge and encouragement, Republic contacted twenty to thirty different companies for the
express purpose of obtaining an offer to purchase all of Won-Door's outstanding stock. The
companies contacted by Republic included National Corp. (hereinafter ""), Drexel Burnham &
Lambert, and Thermal Systems, Inc., (hereinafter, "TSI").7
6.

From approximately March 1986 through August 1986, Watkins met with several

companies introduced by Republic for the express purpose of negotiating a sale of all of WonDoor's stock. The principals of Republic and Watkins jointly met with (early April 1986), a
Salt Lake City based New York Stock Exchange listed company owned by Salt Lake

5

Deposition of Irvin Bird Vol. I, at page 15 & 21; Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of
Mark McSwain. R. pp. 474-486, R. pp. 180-188.
6

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 1 9 - 2 5 , and Exhibit 8, thereof.
Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of Mark McSwain.
7

See also,

R. pp. 281-283 Exhibits "C" and "D" See also, Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages
41 &64.
5

businessman Ian Cumming, and Drexel Burnham & Lambert (May 8, 1986), at the time the
largest merger or acquisition oriented brokerage firm in the United States.8
7.

In March or April, 1986, prior to any contact between Won-Door and TSI,

Republic presented information to Watkins concerning TSI for the purpose of selling all of WonDoor's stock.

Although Republic, in the exercise of its good judgment (specifically in a

discussion between Bird and Watkins) attempted to warn and discourage Watkins from doing
business with TSI, it is undisputed that Republic contacted TSI on behalf of Won-Door
concerning a possible buy-out of 100% of Won-Door's stock in March or April of 1986 and
was, in fact, the procuring cause of the sale of Won-Door's outstanding stock to TSI.9
8.

On or about April 28, 1986, Watkins, without notice to Republic and despite the

fact that Republic (at Watkins' request) continued to contact and solicit offers from various
companies to purchase all of Won-Door's stock, entered into a second finder's agreement with
Boettcher & Company (hereinafter, the "Boettcher Agreement").10 In paragraph 6. of the
Boettcher Agreement, Watkins acknowledged that Won-Door had previously contacted other
companies through another finder.

Pursuant to the Boettcher Agreement, Watkins agreed

without notice to Republic that a maximum of ten of these companies would be excluded from
the Boettcher Agreement.

8

The Agreement, provided that Boettcher would receive a fee of

See Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 41.

9

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 60-61. See also, Affidavit of Irvin Bird, Affidavit
of Mark McSwain and Affidavit of Bryant Cragun. R. pp. 474-486, 180-188, 189-195.
10

R. pp.287-292. The letter agreement between Boettcher & Company and Won-Door
Corporation.

6

$25,000.00 if a transaction was concluded with one of the ten excluded companies.

The

Boettcher Agreement further stated that Boettcher would receive its full fee in the event of a sale
of Won-Door to any company not on the list of ten exclusions.
9.

Watkins did not disclose the existence of the April 28, 1986 agreement with

Boettcher (Boettcher Agreement) to Republic until late May, 1986, even though subsequent to
April 28, 1986, (and prior to Watkins' disclosure to Republic that he had entered into an
agreement with Boettcher) Watkins continued to meet with Republic on a regular basis to review
their progress in finding a buyer and encouraged Republic to continue its efforts to find a buyer
of all of Won-Door's stock. Watkins, also continued to meet with potential purchasers (i.e.
Drexel, Burnham & Lambert - May 8, 1986) brought to Watkins by Republic after he had
entered into an agreement with Boettcher.11
10.

Watkins refused to disclose to Republic at any time any of the terms of the

Boettcher Agreement, with the exception that Watkins stated that his agreement required
Republic to provide a list of ten companies contacted by Republic to be listed as exclusions to
the agreement.12 The only full disclosure of the terms of the Boettcher Agreement to Republic
came during the deposition of Irvin Bird in this case, when the Boettcher Agreement was
produced for the first time.

11

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 27.

12

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 41-44.
7

11.

On May 21, 1986, Republic submitted a list of eleven qualified companies to

Watkins.13 On May 27, 1986, Republic submitted a second list of fifteen additional qualified
companies contacted by Republic on behalf of Won-Door.14
12.

The list of May 27 reflected that Republic had contacted TSI on behalf of Won-

Door and its shareholders.
13.

From the time Republic learned of the Boettcher agreement in late May and

continuing until August 22, 1986, the principles of Republic, on repeated occasions, informed
Watkins that (i) Republic did not recognize that Watkins' undisclosed agreement with Boettcher
was binding on Republic; (ii) that Republic had no duty to limit its fee to a list of ten companies;
(iii) that Republic's fee should not be limited to any list of ten even if Republic submitted such
a list; (iv) that the May 21 list was not the "list of ten" for the purposes of the Boettcher
agreement and (v) if one of Republic contacts purchased all of Won-Door's stock Republic
would be entitled to its fee regardless of the undisclosed terms of Watkins' agreement with
Boettcher, particularly when Republic had, both prior and subsequent to Watkins' agreement
with Boettcher & Co., contacted and sent brochures to approximately thirty companies at
Watkins' direction.15
14.

Independent of the undisclosed terms of Watkins' agreement with Boettcher,

Republic was required to submit names of "qualified companies" to Watkins under the express

13

R. p. 281.

14

R. pp. 282-83.

15

Deposition of Irvin Bird (detailed discussion throughout all of Volume I).
8

requirements of the last paragraph of the March 12 Agreement between Watkins and Republic
to "avoid confusion concerning Republics contacts".16
15.

Paragraph 6 of the Boettcher Agreement specifically required that the list of "ten

exclusions" be submitted to Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986.17 No list of ten exclusions
(or any other number) was ever submitted to Boettcher by Watkins or any one else at WonDoor. Nor is any list submitted to Watkins by Republic, including the May 21, list of eleven
qualified companies or the May 27, list of fifteen qualified companies, found in Boettcher's files.
16.

From approximately May until August 22, 1986, there were continuing

discussions between Watkins and Republic concerning contacts that Republic was continuing to
make with various companies on behalf of Won-Door and its shareholders with a view toward
obtaining an offer for the purchase of all of the outstanding stock of Won-Door at Watkins'
direction.18
17.

During the months of March, April, May, June, July and August, 1986, officers

of Republic had increasingly frequent discussions with Watkins concerning the need to clarify
the fee arrangement with Republic under the March 12 Agreement, inasmuch as Republic was
continuing its efforts to find a buyer for 100% of Won-Door's stock rather than a 22% minority

16

R. p. 122.

17

R. pp. 287-292.

18

Deposition of Irvin Bird (detailed discussion throughout all of Volume I).
9

of the outstanding stock and Won-Door appeared to be moving towards an agreement with
Leucadia, one of Republic's contacts, for a sale of all of Won-Door's stock.19
18.

Watkins at no time stated or otherwise indicated that Republic should not be

entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, and that in fact reassured Republic that it would
receive a fee under the March 12 Agreement. Watkins, when asked by Bird to clarify the fee
provision of the March 12 Agreement made such statements to Mr. Bird as "Irv, we have been
friends for thirty years, trust me, you will get your fee."20
19.

Commencing in April, 1986 and continuing until August 25, 1986, Watkins, on

behalf of the shareholders of Won-Door, conducted serious negotiations with Leucadia for the
purchase of all of the stock of Won-Door.21
20.

At least as early as July, 1986, without the knowledge of Republic, Reed Watkins

entered into negotiations with TSI which eventually culminated with TSI's purchase of WonDoor.22

19

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 36; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment R. pp. 417-473.
20

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 54. See also, Affidavit of Irvin Bird. R. pp. 474-

486.
21

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 82.

22

Affidavit of Irvin Bird R. pp. 474-486.

10

21.

On or about August 22, 1986, because Larry Pinnock of Leucadia, as opposed

to Watkins, had informed Bird that Leucadia (a company contacted by Republic) was about to
make a firm offer for all of Won-Door's stock, and because Republic had yet to obtain a clear
understanding from Watkins as to what it's fee would be under the March 12 Agreement with
Won-Door, Republic had its attorney, Douglas Parry, contact Watkins to demand a fee
agreement prior to the closing of the anticipated acquisition of Won-Door by Leucadia. Parry
followed his telephone contact with Watkins with a letter to Watkins which confirmed Watkins'
acknowledgment to Parry that he and his principals owed an obligation to Republic and Watkins
agreed, among other things, to pay a fee to Republic of $1,000,000.00. Parry also asked
attorney Watkins to immediately get back to him if there where any misunderstandings. Watkins
never contacted Parry as requested in above referenced letter to Watkins.23
22.

Instead, upon receipt of the letter from attorney Parry, Watkins telephoned Bird

late in the afternoon of Friday, August 22, 1986, and informed him that he, Watkins, was on
his way to Republic's office and that a "fee agreement would be negotiated that night".24
Watkins, without notice to Republic's counsel, Douglas Parry, negotiated, hand drafted and
executed the "August 22 Agreement".

23

R. pp. 126-27.

24

Deposition of Irv Bird, Vol. I, page 82. See also Affidavits of Irvin Bird and Mark
McSwain, R. pp. 474-486, 180-188.

11

23.

At this meeting attended by Watkins, Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain, Bird

repeatedly asked Watkins if he was in negotiations with any companies contacted by Republic,
other than ace.25
24.

It is undisputed that Watkins stated he was "dealing with two companies, Leucadia

and one other company which is not a company contacted by Republic and, therefore, the
identity of that company is none of their business." Watkins refused to disclose the identity of
the second company.
25.

Additionally, Watkins stated to Bird and McSwain at the August 22 meeting that

he was amazed that Irv Bird, his life-long friend, did not trust him. Watkins stated that he was
angry and disgusted that Irv Bird thought it necessary to contact Dan Berman's law firm to send
him a demand letter, and that "Dan Berman was the type of lawyer that would hold this matter
in litigation indefinitely and that no one would get paid."26
26.

If TSI is considered one of the "ten listed companies" as referred to in the

Watkin's agreement with Parry, Republic would receive a fee of $1,000,000.00. If TSI was
considered as one of the "ten listed companies" on the August 22, agreement Republic would
be entitled to a fee of $500,000.00 as opposed to the $5,000.00 tendered by the defendants.

25

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 82-83; Affidavit of Mark McSwain R. pp. 180-

188.

26

Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of Mark McSwain. R. pp. 474-486, R. pp. 180-188.
12

27.

On September 30, 1986, Won-Door, together with TSI, entered into a loan

agreement in the amount of $15,000,000 with the Bank of Louisville in contemplation of the
pending acquisition of Won-Door by TSI.
28.

On October 20, 1986, Won-Door entered into a formal Acquisition Agreement

with TSI which by its express terms indicates that it was negotiated at an earlier date.
29.

On October 27, 1986, TSI acquired all of the outstanding shares of Won-Door

Corporation for a cash payment of fifteen million dollars and the exchange of one million shares
of TSI stock valued on that day at $24.75 per share for a total purchase price paid to Won-Door
of $39,750,000.00.
30.

On October 27, 1986, as a result of that transaction, two of the entities which

received cash and stock valued at more than $2,369,000.00 were owned or controlled by
Watkins or his wife. Such entities are (i) Four Oaks, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership in which
Watkins' wife (who is also one of his law partners) is the sole general partner, and (ii) React
Systems, Inc., a defunct Utah public corporation in which Watkins is the sole surviving
shareholder and officer. React Systems, Inc. received $150,750.00 in cash. Four Oaks, Ltd.
received $363,750.00 in cash plus 75,000 shares of T.S. Industries stock then valued at
$1,856,250.00. Neither Four Oaks, Ltd. or React Systems, Inc. owned shares in Won-Door
Corporation prior to October 27, 1986, nor, from any documents related to the transaction is
there any evidence that these entities had any role in the merger transaction, except to receive
payments of cash and stock. Watkins, on October 27, 1986 had outstanding Judgments and
Federal tax liens against him exceeding $400,000.00.

13

31.

Immediately after the acquisition of Won-Door by TSI, Watkins became the chief

financial officer of Won-Door drawing a salary of $100,000.00 per year, and eventually became
CEO of TSI drawing a salary of at least $121,000.00 per year.
32.

It is undisputed that on May 5, 1989 Watkins filed a "no asset" Chapter 7

personal Bankruptcy listing claims exceeding $1,000,000.00, including Judgments and Federal
tax liens dating from 1984 and a debt owed to Republic listed by Watkins as $275,000.00. No
where on Watkins' sworn Bankruptcy schedules do the names Won-Door, TSI, Far/Four Oaks,
Ltd., or React Postal Services, Inc. appear.
33.

It is undisputed that Boettcher & Co. received the sum of $256,000.00 in cash,

an amount which is less than fifty percent of the fee to which Boettcher would otherwise be
entitled under the express terms of the Boettcher Agreement.
34.

It is undisputed that defendants, relying upon provisions of the August 22

Agreement have tendered the sum of $5,000.00 as full payment of Republic's claim for a finders
fee in finding TSI as a buyer for all of Won-Door's stock.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The August 22 Agreement is void or voidable and defendants' reliance on the August
22 Agreement fails as a matter of law because Watkins breached his contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing in negotiating and inducing Republic to enter into the August 22
Agreement by (i) refusing to disclose terms of the Boettcher Agreement, (ii) failing to disclose
that Watkins had, at the time of the August 22 Agreement, been contacted by TSI, a contact
provided by Republic and appearing on the May 27, 1986 list of qualified companies delivered
14

to Watkins, and (iii) by failing to disclose that he had entered into negotiations with TSI for the
purchase of all of Won-Door's stock. This fact was so material to the August 22 Agreement that
Watkins, as a matter of law at the time he negotiated the August 22 Agreement, did not have
any privilege of nondisclosure but had an affirmative duty to fully disclose that, in addition to
Leucadia, he had been contacted by and had entered into negotiations with a contact (TSI)
brought to him by Republic.
The August 22 Agreement is so ambiguous as to the parties' understanding as to which
companies comprised the "list of ten qualified companies" that, even considering all extrinsic
evidence, it is impossible to conclude that there was a meeting of the minds, thus, August 22
Agreement is voidable. There is no list attached to the August 22 Agreement. In fact, there
is no list of ten companies in existence. There is a list of 11 contacts (May 21 list) and a list
of 15 contacts (May 27 list). There is nothing in the August 22 Agreement that in any way ties
it to the May 21 list. It is undisputed that Republic never agreed and in fact disputed that it
should limit its exclusions to ten contacts as Watkins told Republic was required by the Boettcher
Agreement. It is undisputed that after supplying Watkins with both the May 21 list and the May
27 lists, Republic continued to contact companies at Watkins request. Watkins, as a lawyer and
draftsman of the August 22 Agreement, could have easily referred specifically to the May 21
list or listed the ten companies as part of the agreement. It is undisputed that Watkins did
neither.
As a matter of law, the fact that the shareholders of Won-Door elected to sell 100% of
their stock for $39,750,000.00, at $49.69 per share rather than 22% of their stock for
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$7,392,000.00 at $42.00 per share, to a contact provided by Republic under its finders
agreement (the March 12 Agreement), does not render the March 12 Agreement invalid or
unenforceable in that the sale of all of the stock of Won-Door is consistent with (i) the clear
intent of the shareholders of Won-Door in entering into the contract with Republic to raise funds
through the sale of their stock in Won-Door and (ii) with the actions of Watkins subsequent to
the March 12 Agreement whereafter Watkins authorized, participated in, and benefitted from
Republic's continued efforts to find a buyer for all of Won-Door's stock.
As matter of law, the fact that the March 12 Agreement provides for a $250,000.00 fee
to Republic for finding a buyer for 22% of shareholder's stock in Won-Door for $7,392,000.00
and is silent as to what fee would be paid to Republic in the event the shareholders of Won-Door
elected to sell 100% of their shares in Won-Door for $39,750,000.00, does not render the
agreement void or unenforceable in that, as matter of practical construction, the Court, from
plain terms of the March 12 Agreement can, by simple mathematical extrapolation, find a
reasonable fee. This fee, based upon the terms of the March 12 Agreement, is also completely
consistent with Watkin's own interpretation of the what would be a reasonable fee for the sale
of 100% of Won-Door's stock as demonstrated by Watkins prior oral agreements with Irvin Bird
and Republic's attorney Douglas Parry.
As a matter of equity and by virtue of Watkins' actions subsequent to the March 12
Agreement where he (i) continued to encourage, participate in and benefit from Republic's
efforts in finding a buyer for all of Won-Doors stock, (ii) concurrently refused Republic's
requests to enter into a written agreement to clarify a reasonable fee while he insisted that
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Republic rely on his (Watkins') promises that Republic would be paid a reasonable fee in the
event Republic found a buyer for 100% of the stock in Won-Door, and stated that no fee
agreement would be necessary, and (iii) having orally agreed with Irvin Bird and Doug Parry
that a fee of at least $1,000,000.00 was reasonable based upon the terms of the March 12
Agreement, defendants are now estopped from claiming that Republic is not entitled to a fee
reasonably contemplated by the March 12 Agreement.
Plaintiff should have been awarded Partial Summary judgment in the amount of
$1,343,550.00 representing the fee due Republic as reasonably ascertainable from the terms of
March 12 Agreement and the oral agreements regarding a fair fee made by Watkins after the
March 12 Agreement.
There remain questions of fact pertaining to Plaintiffs claims as to constructive fraud and
actual fraud. The District Court should have reserved these issues, as well as the issues of
punitive damages, until the time of trial.
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ARGUMENT

UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE
WATKINS, WHO WAS ALREADY IN A CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHD? WITH REPUBLIC, BREACHED HIS DUTY
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAD* DEALING IN NEGOTIATING
THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT BY BOTH FAILING TO
DISCLOSE WHAT COMPAMES HE WAS DEALING WITH
AND IN MISREPRESENTING THAT, OTHER THAN
LEUCADIA, HE WAS NOT DEALING WITH ANY OF
REPUBLIC'S CONTACTS. ACCORDINGLY THE AUGUST
22 AGREEMENT IS VOD3 OR VOD3ABLE AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
In this case, the defendants based their entire defense on the fact that the August 22, 1986
finders fee agreement was a valid, binding contract and that pursuant to the terms of that August
22 agreement is entitled to a commission of "five thousand dollars ($5,000)" inasmuch as TSI,
the eventual buyer of Won-Door for a total purchase price of $39,000,000.00 was not one of
the ten qualified companies referred to in the August 22 agreement even though TSI was a
contact brought to Won-Door through the efforts of Republic.
Further as evidenced by the brief oral statements my by Judge Daniels at the conclusion of
oral agreement it appears that Judge Daniels based his decision to grant Defendants' motion for
Summary Judgment on the single finding that "based upon the other evidence it is pretty clear
that those ten contacts, when the list of ten was supplied in April, were intended to be the ones
that would entitle Republic to a fee".(R. p. 415).
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Accordingly, the consideration of the validity and applicability of the August 22
agreement is central to this appeal.
Preliminary, it should be noted that defendants having this asserted contract as its defense
to plaintiffs claims for a commission over and above five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), bear
the burden of proving the validity and enforceability of this contract.27
It has been recognized since the beginning of this century that the doctrine of caveat
emptor is no longer uniformly applicable.

A comprehensive review of the background

concerning the changes of Court's attitudes toward the doctrine of caveat emptor is found in
a Texas Law Review article entitled "Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure.28 In addition
to discussing fraud, this article applies the principles of concealment and nondisclosure to
contract law. As stated in that article:
The attitude of the courts toward nondisclosure is undergoing an
change and contrary to Lord Cairn's famous remark, it would
seem that the object of the law in these cases should be to impose
on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever justice,
equity and fair dealing demand it.29
This article goes on to list as one of the principal factors where under the law the courts
have imposed the duty of disclosure in a contractual situation is where the materiality of the fact
not disclosed is substantial:

27

B & R Supply v. Brinehurst . 503 P.2d 316 (1972 Utah).

28

"Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure, Texas Law Review, Vol. XV, Dec. 1936, page

29

Id., at page 31.

1.
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a proper inquiry would be whether the defect concealed by the
vendor was a minor one or one of a serious nature. In a contract
for excavation, was the condition of the land such to impose a
burden out of proposition as to what it would ordinarily be? In a
marriage contract was a matter concealed such as it would go the
essence of the contract or as Professor Williston would say, "Does
it go to the basis of the contract"?30
Since this article, (1936), courts generally, including the courts in Utah, have addressed
these questions and specifically held that when a fact is clearly material to an agreement and one
party to the contract does not know that fact, the contracting party who is aware of the fact does
not have a privilege of nondisclosure and must speak.31 In Elder v. Clawson the Utah Supreme
Court observed:
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain facts is
a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is owing .There
is much authority to the effect that if one party to a contract or
transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not
within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which
he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence or
means of knowledge that are not open to both parties alike , he is
under a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud,
especially when the other party relies upon him to communicate
to him the true state of fact to enable him to judge of the
expediency of the bargain.32

30

Id.

31

Elder v. Clawson 384 P.2d 802 (1963 Utah); Union Tank Car v. Wheat, 387 P.2d 1000
(Utah 1964); Tolboe Construction Company v. Staker Paving & Construction Company, 682
P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
32

Elder at page 805.
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Since Elder, the Utah Supreme Courts have applied these principles beyond fraud cases
and have found that when a fact is so material as to render a transaction unconscionable absent
its disclosure, the contract will be rejected.33 Or, if its nondisclosure results in a unilateral
mistake of fact on the part of one party, and the mistake if mutual would render the contract
void, then the contract is voidable by the party being unaware of the material fact.34
Utah has also found that a duty of "good faith" and "fair dealing" by both statute and
common law exists between parties to a contract,35 and rejected contracts where after review
the course of dealing between the parties found that one party did not act in good faith or dealt
unfairly with the other party.
In the instant case, it is was undisputed in the District Court that the plaintiff was the
procuring cause of TSI purchase of Won-Door's stock. It was also undisputed that at the time
that Watkins entered into negotiations with Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain on August 22, 1986,
he had also previously entered into negotiations with TSI for the purpose of selling all of WonDoor's stock. It is also undisputed that Irvin Bird had discussed TSI directly with Watkins and
had listed TSI many months before on the list of companies Republic had contacted and
submitted this list to Watkins on or about May 27, 1986. However, on August 22 during the
negotiation leading up to the preparation of the August 22 Agreement Watkins, when asked to

33

Union Tank Car . Id.

34

Tolboe Construction, Id. at 846.

35

Section 70 A-l-203 U.C.A. (1953 as amended); Polvglvcoat v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449
(Utah 1979); Leigh Furniture v. Isom. 637 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
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disclose who he was dealing with for the purpose of selling Won Door, told Bird and McSwain
that he was dealing with "Leucadia and one other company, which you (Republic) didn't contact
and therefore, it is none of your business." Specifically, the following is Bird's deposition
testimony concerning the August 22 meeting:36

Q

So on August 22nd, '86 Reed storms into your office and he writes

out the first page of Exhibit 6?
A

Well, not that simply. I had Mr. Mark McSwain there. We had

a couple hours of disagreement. That is when we confronted Reed about any
other companies. We asked Reed to positively identify who the other companies
were, that we would do nothing until we knew who they were. Reed said it was
none of our business. And it's our position at that point we were defrauded
because he knew-he knew that Thermal Systems, T.S. Industries, and TSI had
been our company.
We had a long discussion regarding this fee as it relates no only to but
it might relate to anyone else that we had contacted, and we asked Reed to tell
us who the companies were that were negotiating. He said they were close with
another company besides .

We wanted to know who that was, and Mark

McSwain and I were present. This was a late night meeting; everybody had gone
home. The meeting the next day, or the 23rd was to be held with , and the

36

Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 81-83.
22

pressure of trying to get something down, we did not want to sign this agreement.
Reed said. If vou don't sign this agreement you'll have no agreement
whatsoever, [emphasis added] We said, We think you should tell us who else
you've dealt with. We had some discussion if any of these purchasers were on
Exhibit 4, or on Exhibited

2?

A

~2, we intended to get paid, and Reed told us if we wanted to get

paid at all on we'd have to sign an agreement; otherwise, there would be no
agreement whatever.
Q

And he refused to tell you who Won-Door was dealing with?

A

Absolutely. We wanted to take more time, have it reviewed bv

counsel. Reed sat down on his knee and wrote the thing out. We signed it
and he left, [emphasis added]
Q

Okay. He wrote it in your presence?

A

He did, but not with—yeah.

Q

Now, did he write it after you had apparently argued about it for

two hours?
A

Well, the argument was still going on. We still wanted to know,

we thought it was our right to know who was buying the company besides
Leucadia. He said it was none of our business.
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This recitation and the more detail recitation found in the Affidavits of Irvin Bird and
Mark McSwain of the events leading up to the August 22 meeting and the discussion held at that
meeting have never been rebutted by Watkins.
The entire purpose for the negotiation and execution of the contract on August 22, all of
which were initiated by Watkins in disregard of Republic's attorney request to deal with him,
was to reach an understanding as to what fee that Republic should receive if an entity found by
Republic should purchase all of Won-Door's stock.
It is Defendants' position that because TSI was not listed on the "list of ten companies",
that under the terms of the August 22 Agreement, Republic is only entitled to a fee of $5,000 - Notwithstanding the fact that Republic would be entitled to a fee of $1,342,550 if a fee was
extrapolated from the initial March 12 letter agreement; and notwithstanding the fact that
Watkins agreed to a fee of $1,000,000 under the terms of Watkins agreement with Parry if
Leucadia bought Won-Door; and notwithstanding the fact that Republic would be entitled to a
fee of $500,000 under the terms of the August 22 Agreement if TSI was one of the companies
on the list of ten companies referred to in that agreement.
Under these circumstances, obviously the fact that Watkins had been contacted by TSI
and had entered into serious negotiations with TSI for the purchase of all of the stock in WonDoor were facts that went directly to heart of the negotiation concerning what fee Republic
would be entitled to if one of it's contacts purchased all of Won-Door's stock and as a matter
of contract law that fact that Watkins was in serious negotiation with TSI should have been
disclosed by Watkins at the time the contract was negotiated.
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Under prevailing principles of contract law, Watkins had no privilege of nondisclosure.
Watkins, having failed to make the required disclosure, breached his duty of good faith and fair
dealing with Republic, and Republic is entitled to rescind the August 22, 1986 agreement. This
breach of good faith and fair dealing is particularly aggravated by the fact that it was Watkins,
an attorney, who chose to go around Republics attorney and contact the principles of Republic
directly and after hours insisting that an agreement must be reached that night.

n
THE AUGUST 22, 1986 CONTRACT IS VOID IN THAT
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO WHAT
WAS MEANT BY "ten listed qualified companies".
As stated, the intended purpose of the August 22 Agreement was to reach some
understanding as to the fee due Republic would receive in the event that all of Won-Door stock
is sold to one of its contacts. The fee agreement sets forth a fee schedule and specifically states
that the fee schedule is applicable if Won-Door sells all of its stock to either Leucadia or James
Volker. As almost an afterthought, there is a clause in the contract saying that the contract also
applies to "any of the other qualified ten companies." At the bottom of the contract it states,
"Republic Group also entitled to $5,000.00 if Won-Door sold, but none of the above* become
purchasers of Won-Door." Then the asterisk in the agreement provides, "*i.e., , or ten listed
qualified companies or James Volker."
Defendants argued in the District Court that the reason for the ten listed companies was
to comply with paragraph six of the Boettcher agreement, entered into at a time subsequent with
Watkin's agreement with Republic on March 12 and subsequent to the time Republic contacted
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TSI, whereby Won-Door was required to provide ten exceptions for which Boettcher would not
be entitled to a fee.
Defendants go on to contend that the May 21 letter from Republic to Watkins listing
eleven companies is the list referred to in the August 22 Agreement.
However, it is undisputed that there is, in fact, no list of ten companies. Secondly, it
is also undisputed that no where on the face of either the August 22 Agreement or the May 21
letter is there anything tying these two documents together. Nor is there anything in Parry's
letter to Watkins tying the phrase "list of ten companies" to the May 21 list. Nor, contrary to
Defendant's suggestion to the District Court, was the May 21, 1988 letter or any other list of
ten companies ever attached and or in any other way incorporated as part of the August 22,
contract.
In this regard it certainly would have been a simple matter for Watkins, an attorney, and
the drafter of the August 22 Agreement, to simply refer specifically to the May 21 letter and
attach the May 21 letter or to avoid any confusion, to simply write down the ten listed qualified
companies as part of the agreement.
Plaintiff suggests that Watkins' decision not to involve attorney Parry in the August 22
meeting coupled with his failure to take the obvious course of either specifically referring to the
May 21 list, or list the ten companies in his writing, is clear evidence of his bad faith and
possible fraudulent intent on August 22, 1986. In any event, by these actions, Watkins should
be charged with responsibility for the patent ambiguity in the August 22 Agreement.
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Further in this regard, it is also undisputed that in addition to the May 21 letter listing
eleven companies, Bird submitted an additional list of fifteen companies on May 27, 1986 all
long before the negotiation of the August 22 agreement and pursuant to a requirement of the
March 12 letter agreement.
It is also undisputed that under the Boettcher agreement, all ten exclusions to that contract
needed to be submitted to Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986, several weeks before either lists
were prepared by Republic. It is also undisputed that no list of exclusions was ever submitted
to Boettcher. It is also undisputed that from late May until August 22, there were continuing
discussions and disagreements by Republic that they should not be required to reduce any of
their lists to ten companies to comply with Watkin's subsequent agreement with Boettcher.
Republic also at the time the May 21 list was submitted or shortly thereafter expressly told
Watkins that the May 21 list was not intended as the list of ten companies as required by the
undisclosed terms of the Boettcher Agreement. Finally it is undisputed that Watkins on frequent
and regular basis after the May 21 1986 list and continuing up to August 22, 1986 encouraged
Republic to continue it's efforts in finding additional companies to purchase all of Won-Doors
stock notwithstanding the Boettcher Agreement.
The law in Utah has long recognized if the terms of a contract are so ambiguous to make
it impossible, even after considering extrinsic evidence, to say there was a meeting of the minds,
the contract unenforceable and void.37

37

Pingree, Id.
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In summary, Republic submits that under the above circumstance that there was not a
meeting of the minds as to what was meant by the phrase "the listed ten qualified companies"
as found in the August 22 agreement due to the fact that Watkins affirmative misrepresention
that he was in serious negotiation "with only two companies emit and one other which is not
one of yours" . Republic submits, that under the circumstances, it is patently obvious that if it
had of known that the two companies Watkins with which had been dealing were emit and TSI,
both of which were Republic's contacts that it would not have agreed to the August 22
agreement unless TSI was clearly listed as one of the ten qualified contacts entitling Republic
to a fee of some $500,000.
In the case of C & J Realty. Inc. vs. Willev38. the Utah Supreme Court specifically
stated:
A contract is considered ambiguous if words used to express
meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in the sense
that the contract may be understood to reach two or more
plausible meanings.39
The courts also recognize when documents are incorporated into a contract by
reference, the reference must be clear and unequivocal.40
Applying these principles to these undisputed facts, plaintiff respectfully submits that
the reference, in the August 22, 1986 agreement to " ten listed qualified companies," is

C & J Realty. Inc. vs. Willev. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah 1988).
Id. at pg. 6.
United California Bank vs. Prudential Insurance Co.. 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz. 1983).
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obviously so ambiguous as to what the parties understood to comprise the ten qualified
companies, that this Court cannot find a meeting of the minds as to which ten companies
contacted by Republic are meant by this phrase.41. This is particularly so considering that it
was the defendants in this case, not the plaintiff, who bore the burden of proving the validity
of the /August 22 contract.
The District Court's implied finding that the facts, even if viewed in light most favorable
to the plaintiff, raise no material issue as to the as validity and enforceability of the August 22nd
agreement must be rejected.

41

As a matter of law, the ambiguity of a contract is a question of law. Crowther vs.
Carter. 767 P.2d 129 (Ut.App. 1989).
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Ill
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AS WERE BEFORE
THE DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IT'S
CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.
The letter agreement between Watkins and the Plaintiff dated March 12,
1986 is a valid and binding finder's agreement or contract Between the
Plaintiff and the Defendants and was a binding agreement at the time TSI
purchased all of the stock of Won-Door,
Defendants, in their various memoranda in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment submitted to the District Court have conceded, that Watkins was the express agent of
defendants Won-Door, Jay A. Smart, Ron Smart and the stockholders of Won-Door.
The agency relationship and the broad extent thereof is established by the Agency Letter
entitled "To Whom It May Concern" dated March 13, 1986, executed by Jay A. Smart on behalf
of Won-Door Corporation and its shareholders.
As evidenced by this agreement, the scope of Watkins agency is essentially unlimited as
to the obtaining of funding for Won-Door or its shareholders. There is no restriction in this
document limiting Watkins' authority to the sale of only a portion of the stock of Won-Door.
As stated in the letter, the March 12 letter from Watkins to Plaintiff memorializing the
agreement between Watkins and Republic, that Republic will receive a commission of $250,000
for the placement of twenty-two percent (22%) of the outstanding stock of Won-Door, purchased
by one of Republic's contacts for the sum of $7,392,000.00. Defendants argue that due to the
fact that the shareholder of Won-Door eventually determined to sell one hundred percent (100%)
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of their stock for the sum of $39,750,000.00 to TSI, a company contacted by Republic, such
contract is rendered "obsolete" and therefore void and unenforceable. Further, defendants
argue that because the principals of the plaintiff entered into discussions with Watkins attempting
to reach a written fee agreement clarifying Republic's fee in the event one of the companies
contacted by Republic purchased all of Won-Door's stock, that Republic has somehow
demonstrated or recognized that the March 12 Agreement is not binding and that such
negotiations amount to a further recognition by Republic that it is not entitled to a fee because
100%, as opposed to 22%, of the stock of Won-Door was sold to one of Republic's contacts.
Plaintiff submits that as a matter of common sense and long established principles of
basic contract law defendants' arguments are unsustainable. The clear basic underlying intent
of the parties as evidenced by the March 12 Agreement between Republic and Won-Door was
to pay Republic a commission for raising funding for Won-Door by a sale of their stock.
Accordingly, given this purpose, the issue is whether Republic's rights under the March 12
Agreement should be rendered void and unenforceable by the simple fact that Won-Door decided
to accept an offer for the sale of 100% of its stock by a contact brought to them by Republic.
Utah Courts have held, as a matter of contract law, that the courts may imply or impose
terms to a contract which are either reasonably implied in law or in fact in enforcing the intent
the contract.42
In the instant case, the question is what are the rights of the parties under the March
12 Agreement if Won-Door should sell more than 22% of its stock to a contact procured by of
42

Allstate Enterprises v. Hertford. 772 P.2d 466 (Utah Ct App 1989).
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Republic. In this case the contract is silent as to the rights of the parties if Won-Door's
shareholder decide to sell more than 22% of their stock to a Republic contact.
Plaintiff submits that a matter of practical construction this court can clearly ascertain the
intent of the contracting parties from the express provisions of the contract and from the
subsequent actions of the Defendant in furthering this express intent and impose terms to the
March 12 Agreement which are reasonably implied in both fact and law.
It is undisputed that the underlying intent of the March 12 Agreement is to pay Republic
a fee for raising funds for Won-Door or its shareholders through its efforts in finding a buyer
for the stock of Won-Door. The fee to be paid to Republic, under the March 12 Agreement,
is a function of the amount of stock sold and the price received for that stock.
It is also undisputed that shortly after the March 12 Agreement, the principals of
Republic informed Watkins that there was little interest in purchasing a minority position in a
family held corporation. The principals of Republic specifically asked Watkins' approval to
contact other companies with a view towards purchasing all of Won-Door's outstanding stock.
Watkins did not only agree that Republic should contact other companies with a view towards
purchasing all of Won-Door's outstanding stock, but in fact, encouraged it. This is clearly
evidenced by the fact that commencing in April, 1986, and continuing into early May, 1986,
Watkins, together with principals of Republic, met with Drexel Burnham & Lambert (at WonDoor's offices on May 7, 1986) and (at's offices in April, 1986) for the purpose of negotiating
a sale of 100% of Won-Door's stock. Additionally at this time, Republic discussed at least
twenty to thirty different companies with Watkins, all of which were interested in purchasing
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not less than 100% of Won-Door's stock, which companies included TSI Industries. At no time
did Watkins revoke the March 12 Agreement or express any opinion that the March 12
Agreement was not operative. In fact, Watkins promised Republic that it would be paid a fee
and cited to Irvin Bird their long standing friendship as the reason Watkins should be trusted to
see that plaintiff received its anticipated fee.
The fact that the plaintiff attempted to clarify, by means of written agreement specifically
spelling out precisely what fee would be paid to Republic for the sale of 100% of Won-Door's
stock, and continued to press Watkins for a written clarification setting forth what Watkins
specifically meant by his promises that Republic would be paid a "fair" fee coupled with
assurances such as "don't worry Irvin D., I'll take care of you" certainly does not constitute an
acknowledgement by Republic that it did not have a fee coming to them under the March 12
Agreement if one of Republic's contact bought all of Won-Door's stock.
At his deposition Irvin Bird clearly testified that the basis of this disagreement with
Watkins was not whether Republic were entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, but
was based upon a desire to reach a clear understanding as to what Republic's fee should be in
the event one of Republic's contacts purchased 100% of Won-Door's stock.
Question (Faber): But up to at least May 21st, 1986, the only
fee agreement that you had would have been embodied in the
March 12th letter, right?

33

Answer (Bird): Not really, We had verbal agreements. The fact
that we were working together, we had — it might be the only one
in writing but we had verbal ones all along. We work on a daily
basis. Hell almighty, you didn't think we were working for free
did you."43
In the District Court Defendants relied on the case of Bunnel v. Bills44 as supporting
their argument that the March 12 Agreement must specifically provide for the sale of 100% of
Won-Doors stock and the fee for such a sale must be specifically stated if the March 12 is to
be enforceable is not well taken. The court in Bunnel rejected the defendant's argument that an
earnest money agreement was void because it was indefinite as to what personal property and
fixtures would be transferred in the sale of an Alta restaurant, and held as follows:
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court that the
defendant Stevens had a manifest intention to be bound by the
terms that were offered by Bunnel and if so, in light of the
circumstances under which the agreement was entered can the
intention of the parties be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
Stevens' claims that realty represented by Smith was acting as
Bunnel's agent for the purpose of procuring a sale of the Alta
Lodge. For this reason, the instrument in question was drafted by
Schmidt as her agent, and must be construed most strongly against
her. . . . In any event, the intentions of the parties obtained with
reasonable certainty must be given effect and the rule of
construction, [strict construction] presented by Stevens will not be
applied.45
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Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 51.
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Bunnel v. Bills. 368 P.2d 596 (Utah 1962).

45

Id. at p. 600.
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As stated, the intentions of the parties in this case, as evidenced by the Agency Letter
and the March 12 Agreement, is clearly to raise funding for Won-Door. Initially, Won-Door
wanted to sell only 22% of its stock, however, when that became difficult, Watkins specifically
authorized plaintiff to proceed to contact companies to purchase 100% of the corporation's stock
and for this purpose met personally with the principals of Republic together with contacts
presented by Republic (including evens and Drexel Burnham & Lambert) and eventually, but
without disclosure of any kind to Republic, concluded the sale of 100% of Won-Door's stock
to TSI, an entity previously brought into the transaction by Republic.

Further, Watkins

repeatedly assured Republic that it would receive a fee for its services.

Under these

circumstances, and by the acts of Won-Door's agent Watkins, defendants have clearly manifested
their interpretation of the March 12 Agreement in a manner entirely consistent with the intent
of the parties as can be derived from the "four corners" of the March 12, agreement.

B.
Defendants, by the conduct of their own agent, Reed Watkins,
are estopped to deny, (i) the validity of the March 12
Agreement, and (ii) that a fee based upon a reasonable
application of the March 12, Agreement is due Republic.
The basic equitable principle of contract by estoppel is set forth in the case of Sugarhouse
v. Anderson46, a 1980 Utah case cited by the defendants in their Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sugarhouse court specifically states:
46

Sugarhouse v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980).
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We note that this jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of promissory
estoppel whereby an individual who has made a promise which an
individual should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or third person, and which does induce
such action or forbearance is estoppel [sic] to deny or repudiate the
promise should the promisee or third party suffer detriment
thereby47.
In accordance with this clear statement of basic contract law, the defendants should be
estopped from the repudiating the enforceability of the March 12 Agreement. As stated above,
Watkins from March through August 22, 1986, instructed the plaintiff to find contacts who
might be interested in acquiring all of the stock of Won-Door. When asked to clarify in writing
what fee the plaintiff would receive in the event all of the stock of Won-Door was purchased by
one of Republic's contact, Watkins refused to enter into a written agreement and deflected the
demand for such an agreement by relying upon his friendship and past relationship with Bird and
assuring the plaintiff that it would be paid a fee and that he should be trusted and that either a
fee agreement was unnecessary or that he (Watkins) would eventually work out a written
understanding regarding Republic's fee arrangement. Relying upon Watkins' promises, the
plaintiff spent substantial time and effort finding many companies qualified to acquire all the
stock of Won-Door.
One of these companies found by Republic was TSI, which acquired 100% of the
outstanding shares of Won-Door for the sum of $39,750,000.00. Under these circumstances and
consistent with Sugarhouse, supra, defendants are clearly estopped from denying that the March
12 Agreement constitutes a binding contract requiring Won-Door to pay a fee to Republic, or
47

A/., at p. 1373.
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that the subsequent oral promises by Watkins constitute a binding agreement, standing alone, to
pay Republic a fee consistent with and reasonably implied by the terms of the March 12
Agreement.
Not only are defendants estopped by their actions subsequent to March 13, 1986 to assert
that Republic is not entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, but they are estopped to
assert that because the amount of such fee is not specifically spelled out by such contract, that
the contract is unenforceable.
As stated, it is undisputed that Republic primarily through its President, Irvin Bird,
repeatedly "hammered" on Watkins to negotiate an agreement clarifying what fee Republic
would be paid in the event Won-Door sold all of its stock to one of Republic's contacts.
Obviously the reason for entering into these negotiations was that both parties recognized that
a fee of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a sale of only twenty-two percent (22%) was
not reasonable for a sale of one hundred percent (100%) of the outstanding stock of Won-Door.
Watkins did not tell Republic that a fee was not negotiable, but only refused to settle the
issue by an agreement reducing the fee to writing.
In this regard, it is, however, undisputed that Watkins did in fact enter into oral
agreements for the payment of an appropriate fee in particular circumstances. On May 7, 1986,
when Drexel Burnham met with Watkins, the Smarts and a principal of Republic, Irvin Bird,
told Watkins that Drexel would require a fee of ten percent (10%) of the purchase price to sell
all of Won-Door's stock. Bird told Watkins that Republic would split that fee with Drexel (5%
each). Watkins stated that this fee arrangement would be acceptable. However, such oral
37

agreement was not taken further because Watkins never entered into any relationship with
Drexel.
Additionally, there were discussions between Watkins and Bird that an extrapolation of
a fee based upon the ratio between twenty-two percent and one hundred percent would be
reasonable. That is, Republic's fee would be approximately one million dollars.
Probably the most telling evidence of Watkins' interpretation of the obligation imposed
upon the shareholders of Won-Door if they sold all of their stock to a buyer found by Republic
is found in Watkins' agreement with Douglas Parry, as confirmed in the August 20, 1986 letter
from Parry to Watkins. This letter confirms that Watkins agreed with Parry to pay a fee of
$1,000,000.00 based upon a ratio of $250,000.00 for every 22% stock sold by Won-Door's
shareholder to one of Republics contacts.
Watkins, having entered into these oral fee agreements with the plaintiff and Parry, is
estopped from now asserting that the March 12 Agreement is void because it contains an
ambiguity as to what fee Republic would receive if all of the stock of Won-Door was sold.
Further, for the same reason above stated, defendants are also estopped to deny that the
reasonable intentions of the parties as to an appropriate fee cannot now be ascertained from the
March 12 Agreement.
In light of the foregoing, the Court can clearly ascertain the intent of the parties and
impose a fee obligation as clearly implied from both the terms of the March 12 Agreement and
the actual intent as evidenced from Watkins' discussions with Irv Bird regarding a contemplated
50/50 split of Drexel's 10% fee with Republic and what amounts to a clear agreement with
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Republic's attorney Douglas Parry of a fee of $1,000,000.00 based upon the terms of the March
12 Agreement.
An application of these facts demonstrates that a term reasonably drawn from the March
12 Agreement is that Republic is entitled to a fee representing 3.38% of the sales price of the
amount received by Won-Door for the sale of their stock. Obviously, Won-Door agreed to pay
to Republic the sum of $250,000.00 if Republic raised $7,392,000.00. The resulting fee as a
percentage of the money raised through the sale of Won-Door's stock is derived from a fraction,
the numerator of which is $250,000.00 (agreed fee) and the denominator of which is
$7,392,000.00 (money raised). The resulting percentage is 3.38%.
Applying the commission percentage of 3.38% based upon the relationship of $250,000
for every 7,392,000 paid for Won-Door's stock, Republic's fee would be 3.38% of
$39,750,000.00, or $1,343,550.00. Not only is this fee a precise mathematical extrapolation
of the terms found in the March 12 Agreement but is entirely consistent with the approach
Watkins used in reaching an "agreement" with Doug Parry.
It is a basic principle of contract law that when a contract is silent as to what fee will be
paid, the court can as matter of practical construction substitute a reasonable fee.48 Further,
it is a basic principle of contract law that if the intentions of the parties can be reasonably
determined from within the four corners of the contract, their intentions will be given full
effect.49 Plaintiff submits that the parties' intentions as to what fee should be paid for the
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Contracts. Am.Jur.2d Sections 242-255.
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Id.
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money raised on behalf of Won-Door by Republic can be reasonably determined from the face
of the March 12 Agreement. It is clear that the parties intended that Republic's commission
would be a function of the dollars raised from the sale of Won-Door's stock. In terms of
percentages, that intent translates into a commission of 3.38% of every dollar raised by
Republic.
Finally, defendants' arguments to the District Court that the case of Pingree vs.
Continental50 renders the March 12 Agreement unenforceable because this Court cannot, under
Pingree51. substitute its judgment as to what constitutes a reasonable fee misstates the holding
of the court in Pingree52.
In Pingree53 the court was dealing with an option to renew which, on its face, was an
agreement by the parties to agree upon a reasonable rental value in the future. The option stated
that the reasonable rent should not exceed $800 and required that the parties agree upon a
reasonable rental by taking a variety of specifically listed factors or circumstances into
consideration. In rejecting the trial court's determination that a reasonable fee was $800, the
Supreme Court found that factors or circumstances that were listed in the contract upon which
the parties were required to base their agreement were extremely vague and in fact lead to such
completely opposite results as to what was a reasonable fee, that the trial judge had no basis in
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the option contract for finding what a reasonable rental would be under the circumstances. The
facts in Pingree54 are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the instant case and, in fact, the
holding in Pingree55 completely supports Plaintiffs position that the trial court can find and
impose a reasonable fee if the contract and the extrinsic facts demonstrate that it is reasonable.
In this case reasonable fee can easily be derived from the March 12 Agreement by an application
of simple mathematics.
C.
The Plaintiff was in fact the procuring cause of the sale of the shareholder's
stock in Won-Door to TSI and Plaintiff is entitled to a commission as
reasonably contemplated under the terms of the March 12 Agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendants.
In dealing with finder's fee agreements, courts have long applied what is commonly
known as the "procuring cause" rule. The procuring cause rule states that when a party is
employed to procure a purchaser, and does procure a purchaser to whom a sale is eventually
made, he is entitled to the agreed upon commission regardless of who makes the final sale if the
party seeking to compel payment of the commission is a procuring cause of the sale.56
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff, Republic, was the procuring cause
of TSI and that TSI eventually purchased all of the shares of Won-Door. It is undisputed that
in March, 1986, Watkins authorized Republic to search for qualified companies who were
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Willis vs. Chamnlin Cable Corporation. 740 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988).
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interested in acquiring all of the stock of Won-Door. Irvin Bird, who was the President of
Republic, was also, at that time, President of a company known as Western Sun. Western Sun
was in the insulation business. It was engaged in the same business as TSI. Both Western Sun
and TSI were outgrowths of a predecessor company known as Panelera. As a result of Bird's
experience with TSI, he was aware that TSI was a logical candidate for the purchase of WonDoor in that Won-Door was engaged in the building materials business specializing in core
insulated doors. Bird was aware that TSI had recently been interested on the "acquisition trail"
and had been acquiring a variety of companies in the building materials business. Further, both
TSI's and Won-Door's major manufacturing plants were located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Further, Mr. Bird was aware that TSI needed a company with substantial earnings like WonDoor.
Therefore, Bird asked his associate, Bryant Cragun, to make contact with TSI. In a
subsequent meeting with Watkins, whereat TSI was discussed as a possible purchaser of WonDoor's stock, Mr. Bird admittedly informed Reed Watkins that although TSI was a logical
candidate to purchase Won-Door, Watkins should be cautious and it was Bird's recommendation
that a merger with TSI should not be concluded in that TSI was looking primarily for a company
to increase the value of insider stock as opposed to other legitimate business purposes - as Bird
put it "a box job."
Defendant's suggestion that Republic should not be entitled to a fee as a result of the TSI
acquisition of Won-Door because Bird warned and discouraged Watkins from doing business
with TSI is not completely beside the issue. There is no dispute that Republic was the fmder
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acquisition, Henry Lorin and other TSI insiders where convicted or plead guilty to securities
fraud in connection with the manipulation of I SI stock, I 'artially as result of these activities TSI
was forced in to Bankruptcy in February of 1989. A detailed account of the concerns Bird
expressed to Watkins is found in a article appearing the March 16, 1987 issue of Barrons entitled
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had asked Bryant Cragun, an associate of Republic to deliver the Won-Door package to TSI.
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Approximately two days after this conversation, Jensen called Cragun back and reported
that he talked to Lorin and not only was TSI interested in purchasing Won-Door, but was
anxious to receive information about Won-Door.
At that time, Cragun and a Mr. Don Wood went to Jensen's office in Salt Lake City,
Utah and delivered to him the financial package concerning Won-Door, which information was
prepared by Republic. Jensen stated he would immediately forward the information to Lorin.58
In a subsequent meeting with Watkins and Bird, Cragun informed Watkins that they had
delivered Won-Door's package to Henry Lorin at TSI. Aside from Bird's conversation with
Watkins, warning him about TSI, TSI was not again mentioned in the discussions between
Watkins and the principals of Republic until Won-Door had concluded its merger with TSI.
This fact did not strike Republic as unusual since Bird had in good faith advised and warned
Watkins against doing business with TSI.59
Under these facts, it cannot be disputed that Republic was, in fact, the "procuring cause"
of the acquisition of all of Won-Door's stock by TSI. In this regard it should be noted that
nowhere in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment do the defendants
take the position that Republic was not, in fact, the "procuring cause" of the merger between
TSI and Republic.
As set forth above, based upon the undisputed facts, the March Agreement entitles
Republic to a finder's fee upon the completion of the sale of Won-Door's stock to TSI. Further,
58
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Poggi61, the defendant Tool Research
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for the sale of "gas deflector doors ^ .inn? the State of Washington.
!l

"ii s [Uilll I PIHVPII

l

ill 1 liiilni((iisli!||i l i p r e e m n i l hi 1 M, i In hi1 rnlitli (I In 11 niiniiissinii II.IM il

upon his sales. Such distributorship and commission agreement was terminable upon thirty days
notice by either party.
Poggi eventually procured Boeing Aircraft for Fool Research as a customei

Boeing

4 ircraft entered an initial order for six hundred pieces.
Attb-

" I c: ol agreed that the order from, Boeing was

amount of gas deflector shields than anticipated at the time they entered into the conti ,;tt:l

commission due to anticipated increase in volume. These negotiations, proceeded, contrary to
the instant case., in good faith Before the conclusion of the agreement for the new commission
structure, Boeing indicated that they were going to begin negotiating with Tool for an additional
nine hundred pieces. Before the additional nine hundred pieces were concluded, defendant Tool
"l"1" Poggi vs. Tool Research and bngineenng 'IMl I"1 ,M *% (Wiisli l%9)
111111,
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broke off negotiations for the revised commission structure and under the contract terminated
Poggi's distributorship. After the effective date of Poggi's termination, Boeing placed the order
for the nine hundred pieces.

Defendant Tool Research citing the termination of the

distributorship, refused to pay the commission due Poggi on the contract for the additional
orders concluded after the effective date of Poggi's termination. In rejecting the defendants'
position, the Court held:
Although [Tools Research] had a right under the sales
representative agreement to effectively termination the agency on
notice, the termination could not rightfully operate to cut off the
agent's rights to commissions already earned. As a procuring,
efficient cause of the two orders, the agent here earned his
commission under the contract which accorded him a commission
on all remittances received for all formal orders. Nothing in the
contract excluded or cut off his rights to commission on orders
procured by him but paid after termination. Plaintiff performed
the work, produced the desired results and earned his pay.62
Further, the Court in Poggi went on to reject the discount of Poggi's commission
imposed by the trial court, based upon the reasoning that subsequent negotiations did not entitle
a court to impose its own judgment as to what would be a fair commission and thereby reduce
the commission based upon subsequent negotiations, in a manner inconsistent with the terms of
the parties prior written fee agreement.

The Poggi court found that notwithstanding the

termination of the contract, plaintiff had proved that he was a procuring and efficient cause of
subsequent order from Boeing and should be paid commission based upon the terms of the
written fee agreement. Applying the reasoning of Poggi to this case, the mere fact that plaintiff
62

Poggi, at page 302.
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PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT WATKINS' STOOD IN A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATION WITH THE PLAINTIFF OR
THAT WATKINS COMMITTED ACTUAL FRAUD IN HIS
DEALINGS WITH THE PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff has also claimed in this matter HrM WuiMnw w'>« HI
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or relationship of trust with Republic. Plaintiff has presented substantial evidence that Watkins',
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relationship of confidence with Republic and in fact relied and used this relationship in dealing

Further, Plaintiff has set forth substantial facts, which, particularly when viewed in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, that demonstrates that Watkins conduct towards Republic
was part of a fraudulent course of dealings designed Incmkii lumsrlt i\\ flic r\|viiM mil V\ \\\\\\\w
and Watkins' past creditors
Howe

i

evidence, and that courts may consider these fact, when taken in a light most favorable to the
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Defendants, to present genuine issues of material fact as to this claim and accordingly Plaintiff
did not move for Summary Judgment on these issues.
However, by the same token Defendants were not entitled to Summary Judgement in
their favor on Plaintiff's claims of constructive fraud, actual fraud and punitive damages.
Regardless of whether Watkins' actions in dealing with Republic were motivated by
fraudulent intent or merely by a misunderstanding of his duties toward Republic, the existing
contractual relationship required of him a duty of "good faith" and "fair dealing." Therefore,
Watkins clearly had a duty to disclose his dealings with TSI to Republic and Plaintiff was
entitled to Partial Summary Judgment against Defendants in the amount of $1,342,550.00
pursuant to the terms of the March 12 Agreement with the Defendants and clearly Summary
Judgment in favor of the Defendants terminating the action in Defendants' favor was in error.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts as established in the Record of this case demonstrates the unfairness
of Watkins' dealings with Republic. A detailed review of these facts as established by the
Record in this case together with correct application of principles of contract law compel the
conclusion that, if not entitled to Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $1,343,550.00
against Defendants on Plaintiff's contract claims, and that Plaintiff was certainly entitled to the
opportunity to complete it's discovery and submit it's claims to a jury and that the granting of
Summary Judgment by the District Court in favor of the Defendants was in error.
DATED the ^~D

day o ^ 2 a S ^ 1 9 9 2 f . 3

Richard/fC. 0-andall, Esq.
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BRIAN W.BURNETT

PHONE BOI 486-5634

March 12, 1986

., Jr.
The Republi: Group
185 South Main Street
Suite 1050
Salt Late Ctiy, Utah 84111

Dear Irv:
This letter" will confirm o n understanding' of a fee arrangement
should The Republic Group through its contacts fund, a private placement of Won-Door Corporation stock..
The anount of 'the funding is $7f392,000 f . 176,000 shares of the
'Won-Door stock. This is computed, at $4,2, On :> share. .Members of the
Start family are the sellers.
Won-Door will have 800,000 shares outstanding (all comon and
of one class) after completion of the funding. The 176,000 shares
represents twenty-two (22%) percent thereof. Won-Door is adjusting
its executive bonus plan which will result in increased corporate
earnings over the amount set forth in the Selected Pro ftorma Financial
Infonretion. Wbn-Door anticipates is June 30, 1986 after-tax earnings
to be not less than $2,688,000.
It is Wbn-Door1 s intentto'becane a public cnpany within a fi u e
year period,,.
Upon completion and execution of such funding arrangement with The
Republic Group's contact (s), a conmission of $250,000 will be paid to
The Republic Group. The Republic Group will bear its own costs. Tb
avoid misunderstanding regarding contacts, names should be submitted
and their status qualified in advance.
Trii] y Yours,

Reed" A. Watkins
F W lit

0."

Boettcher & Company
aa^mteenttistrwt

A p r i l 2 8 , 1986

P.O. Box 54

*

XT

Denver, Colorado 60201-0054
(303)6284000

Mr. Jay Smart
Chairman
Won-Door Corporation
1865 South 3480 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84104

Dear Jay:
The purpose of this letter is to confirm in writing the
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and
Won-Door Corporation ("the Company") whereby Boettcher will act
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to
negotiate, on such terms as may be acceptable to the Board of
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning
either:
(i)

the sale of all or a portion of the outstanding stock or
assets of the Company# or

(ii)

the acquisition, consolidation or merger of the company.

Our arrangements with you in connection therewith shall be
as follows:
1)

Boettcher shall commence its activity following
acceptance and approval of this agreement by the
Company.

2)

Boettcher shall work with the Company in the preparation
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memorandum"). This
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the
Company, its operations, management, current financial
data and other appropriate information. The Offering
Memorandum will be used in discussions with prospective
purchasers and its form and content shall be subject to
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof,
the Company and Boettcher shall have the unrestricted
right to use the Offering Memorandum during the term of
this agreement. The Company understands and confirms

EXHIBIT - _ ft-fifi o p - *
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Mr* Jay Smart
April 28, 1986 - Page T w o

(i) that Boettcher will he u liny and relying on data,
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not*assume
responsibility for independently verifying the information
the Offering Memorandum* The Company hereby represents and
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.
ttcner understands the confide n 11 a 1 i :t c 1 1 :it in e o f t h I s p r o j e c t
• will work with you to maintain the • r- : i il::i dentiality you
.:t. If any companies, entities, or individuals shoul d
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these e x c l u s i o n s .
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to
be a prospective purchaser of the Company. A l l
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the
transaction shall be marked "Confidential* and delivered to
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company.
4)

Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive
basis for a period of four months from the date of the
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its
activities and progress.. In this role, except as discussed
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive
representative of the company in connection with any
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity
• concerning any sale and any other acquisition, consolidation
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisition,
consolidation or merger on! y through B o e t t c h e r . In the event
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so
inform us when you become aware of such Inquiry, In the
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you
eventually conclude an agreement is referred to us by
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Mr. Jay Smart
April 28, 1986 - Page Three

another party, all compensation due such party, which
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be
our responsibility. The Company will be responsible for any
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial,
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or
retained by the Company, its officers, directors or
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its
expenses in connection with any such transaction.
5)

Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will
include but not be limited to, participation in the
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations
between you and the prospective purchasers. This fee shall
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders
in the event of a stock sale, as follows:

(i)

5% of any amount up to $999,999; plus

(ii)

4% of any amount from $1,000,000 to $1,999,999; plus

(iii)

3% of any amount from $2,000,000 to $2,999,999; plus

(iv)

2% of any amount from $3,000,000 to $3,999,999; plus

(v)

1% of any amount over $4,000,000.•

For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received,
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock,
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon
the fair market value of the debt or equity securities. The
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as
follows: If any of the securities to be received are traded
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such
securities on the registered national exchange providing the
primary or largest market in such securities on the last
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any
of the securities to be received are not traded on a
registered national exchange but are quoted in the over-thecounter market, the fair market value of such securities

000289
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the
sale is consummated.
"Earnout shall be defined as any caijh, secuiities, oi othei
remuneration received as a result of the future performance
of the Company, or as a result of any noncorapetef consultinqr
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a
result of the sale.
The final Purchase Price and all oLJjei terms and conditions
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board
of directors and, If appropriate, the Stockholders of the
Company,
")

The Company has previously contacted certain companies
through other intermediaries regarding a possibles^fie ot or
investment in the Company. The names of theseftfftitiesshall
be provided in writing to Boettcher within itWousiness days
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten
companies. In the event a transaction of the type
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties,
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services
rendered. In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company
agrees it will not provide any information prepared t^
Boettcher tn these parties'.

4 j Subject Lu paragraph 10 M i wf Hue fees to Boettcher shall be
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable
in cash in full at the closing of any such transaction,
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings
or other "earnout" formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at f lie
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining
the Purchase Price and applying the above peicentaqe tee,
II

Except a1 specifically stated in paragraph 10 ul Uuagreement, the above-described compensation shall be in ful]L
payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^nd
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a
closing, c;hal1 the Company he liable for any out-of-pocket
expenses, or for the services of otheis whom Boettcher may
employ to assist in the transaction.
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9)

After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher
shall be entitled to its full fee as set forth in this
agreement,.

10) This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by
written notice. In the event of the termination of this
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the
Company shall reimburse Boettcher for all its direct, out-ofpocket expenses incurred in connection with this transaction;
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes entitled to a fee
r paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee
I
shall De given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed
^^--w pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket
(jt £ j expenses shall be due and payable within three days after
^ notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of
v
expenses incurred.
11) In connection with the performance of the services described
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to
which Boettcher or any such officer, employee, agent or
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and
services referred to in this agreement under any of the
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any
such officer, agent, employee or person for any legal or
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, agent or person
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims,
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or ai e based
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the
statements made in the Offering Memorandum or by tte Company
not misleading,
-6nnnooi

Mr. Jay Smart
April 28, 1986 - l',ii|i ". x

12) It is understood that if anj transaction is completed,
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to place an
C
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire,
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in
,
/
such transaction. Any such announcement shal 3 be in a form L ^ t *&*£>'&
reasonably acceptable to the Company..
If the foregoing represents a correct statement of our
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement* If
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall
thereupon ex 1 \\\ ,
'
Very truly youii ,,
BOETTCHLlt k CUMl/'N

i

C-z^Tamesf Bode
Vice President
Corporate Finance Department
^

7->L.

G. Michael Moore
Senior Vice President
Corporate Finance Department
The above is hereby acknowledged
and accepted:
WON-DOOR CORPORATION

By
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Fred Vclcansek
The Republic Group
iS5 South State, Suite 1050
S*lt 7-A* <~'ty, LIT
84115
Lair Fred:
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Capital Consultants, Inc.

June 5, 1986

Donald G. Calder
c/o G. L. Ohrstrom & Co.
540 Madison Avenue
New York, NY
10222
Dear Mr. Calder:
Today, Sandy Baldwin of Dominick & Dominick called me
regarding a company that my associates and I have available
for sale. At Sandy's request I am providing you with financial statements and brief marketing brochures for your
perusal. Sandy will provide you with a video tape which is
excellent in representing the unique qualities of this company.
This information is being delivered to you on a confidential
basis and serves as your introduction to Won-Door Corporation,
a privately held Utah corporation. It is my request that
after you have had the opportunity to preliminarily review
this information, that we have a conference call to review
the financials and answer any specific questions you may have.
If there is sufficient interest, we could then talk in terms
of a meeting in Salt Lake City to introduce you to the principals of the Company.
Our agreement allows us to introduce Won-Door Corporation to a few select buyers. As stated above, this corporation is privately held and is the result of the efforts of a
single family. Mr. Jay Smart, the founder and principal
owner, has been responsible for the unique product development,
and his son, Mr. Ron Smart, has developed an extremely talented
organization for the manufacturing and distribution of that
product. Ron has implemented successful procedures for
purchasing, manufacturing, inventory, shipping, quality control,
and marketing. This combination of talent and product results
in the excellent financial position which the Company presently
enjoys.
Because the principals desire that the Company not be
solicited on the open market, I hereby request that you only
use these materials for your comoany's information.
~T~
EXHIBIT " - J J
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Donald G. Calder
c/o G. L. Ohrstrom & Co.
June 5, 1986
Page Two
I look forward to the possibility of working with you
and feel that Won-Door Corporation is an excellent vehicle
for us to explore and complete. I await your earliest response
to this information.
Respectfully,

CAPITAL/CONSULTANTS, INC.

BDC/dhs
Enclosures
cc:

A. T. Baldwin, Jr.
Irvin D. Bird, Jr.

0DO,°q
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May 21, 1986

Reed A. Watkins
Watkins & Fabcr
2102 E. 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

Dear Rabd,
This letter server, as formal notice to you of our list of prospective
buyers for the Wen Doer Corporation.
1. tics, T<z.y Corp.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Capital Cons"a]tanto I n c .
The Republic Group
The Dallas Corp.
Leucadia I n c .
Weyerhaeuser Corp.

7. Mi sec

8.
9.
30.
11.

Peichtree Door, A Division of Indal Corp.
Amstronq
World Corp.
TeZedyne Corp.
D^ninick * Dcminick

We appreciate your desire to work with us and hope that you know tiiat we
are working diligently to effect the sale of your client's company.
Personal Regards,

Frederick W. Volcansek
Vice President
The Republic Group

cc: Bryant D. Craguu
Irvin D. Bird Jr.
Mark E. McSwain
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B E R M A N & O'RORKE
A PROVISIONAL CORPORATION

DANIEL L BEWMAN
PATRICIA A. O'MORKC
OOUCLAS J PA«RY
PEGGY A TOM5IC
• LAKE S. ATKJN
THOMAS A. MITCHELL

• UITE ItSO

O. FRANK WILKINS
OF COUNSEL

SO SOUTH MAIN STREET

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
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August 20, 1986

Reed A. Watkins, Esq.
Watkins & Faber
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
RE:

The Republic Group/Won-Door

Dear Mr, Watkins:
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone
conversation of last week and your assurance that you
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an
interest in Won-Door.
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that:
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia,
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased,
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee.
If that does not comport with your understanding I would
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this
matter with my client.
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees.

0 0 01 26
-14-

Reed A. Watkins, Esq.
Page 2
August 20, 1986
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the
agreement.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <2j day of January, 1993,1 caused a four (4) copies
of Appellant's Brief (as corrected) to be mailed, first class postage prepaid to the following:
Walter F. Faber, Jr., Esq.
WATKINS & FABER
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
David E. Hardy, Esq.
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard Rappaport Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Robert G. Norton
Attorney at Law
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